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A TALE OF TWO SOVEREIGNS:
DANGER AND OPPORTUNITY IN
TRIBAL-STATE COURT RELATIONS

Tonya Kowalski*

ABSTRACT

As the many Native American nations garner economic strength and come into
increasing contact with state and local forums, so do the chances that those forums will
come face to face with questions of tribal law. The challenges posed by an AngloAmerican court answering questions of tribal law present both danger and opportunity.
Opportunities come with strengthened inter-sovereign relationships and with the
acknowledgement of tribal legal potency by other forums. Dangers inhere in crosscultural illiteracy and particularly in the temptation to ignore abstention principles and to
attack tribal jurisdiction. It may be possible for tribal courts to gain some of the
advantages and ameliorate some of the dangers by entering into a variety of cooperative
arrangements with state courts. In an arrangement of true parity, these options may also
provide avenues for tribal courts to obtain assistance in answering important questions of
state law in tribal court cases.
The purpose of this article is to bring together the various options for tribal and
state court cooperation for the analysis of tribal law questions. They may include
cooperative organizations, abstention, certification, and even formal consultation
agreements between particular courts, such as the recent, historic accord between the
high courts of New York and New South Wales. The article further concludes that each
option has costs and benefits, and that individual tribal nations must each undertake their
own cost/benefit analyses to determine which action - or none at all - is the most
likely to benefit tribal sovereignty and institutions based on their goals, history,
relationships with state and local entities, and even relationships between individual
leaders in the state and tribal justice systems.

* Associate Professor of Law, Washburn University School of Law; J.D., Duke University School of
Law, 1995; B.A., University of Florida, 1992. For their valuable comments, I thank my Washburn Law
colleagues, Prof Eric Jensen of Fordham University School of Law shared the very helpful news of the New
York-Australian courts consultation agreement. For their insightful research support, I am also grateful to
Creighton Miller, J.D., M.L.I.S., and Katy McMullen, J.D. 2012, Washburn University School of Law.
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INTRODUCTION

Institutional arrangements are considered sacred in many different cultures. In
American Indian communities the sacredness of institutional arrangementsis embedded
in a broader sacred and moral community. The Great Spirit is the organizer of the
universe, and, in American Indian views, human relations are not central to the direction
andforces of the universe. Humans are one among many spiritbeings in the universe ...
-all the animate and inanimate elements that make up the universe .... The Native view
of community extends to every spirit being in the universe, as well as to fellow humans
and institutionalrelations.. . . [S]ocial relations and institutions are sacred and require
mutual obligationsand responsibilities....
-Duane Champagnel
It was the best of times, it was the worst of times,
it was the age ofwisdom, it was the age offoolishness,
it was the epoch of belief it was the epoch of incredulity,
it was the season ofLight, it was the season ofDarkness,
it was the spring ofhope, it was the winter of despair,
we had everything before us, we had nothing before us,
we were all going direct to heaven, we were all going direct the other way .. .[
-Charles Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities2
The story of the relationship between American Indian Nations and their
surrounding states is a tale of two sovereigns,3 in many ways these sovereigns are on
parallel tracks within a larger, tri-federal system, 4 and in many others they intersect sometimes on a collision course, sometimes in cooperation. As Tribal and state judges
take steps toward greater cooperation, it helps to recognize that Tribal-state5 relations are
rooted in oppression, genocide, and violent conflict over scarce resources: historically, in
the form of land for westward expansion, and currently, over jurisdiction and Tribal
revenue sources like gaming and taxes. For centuries now, it has been the very worst of
times. But in the last two decades, with the advent of Indian gaming and federally
mandated programs, there has been a "spring of hope" in the form of increased state1. DUANE CHAMPAGNE, SOCIAL CHANGE AND CULTURAL CONTINUITY AMONG NATIVE NATIONS 11-13

(2007).
2 CHARLES DICKENS, WORKS OF CHARLES DICKENS: A TALE OF Two CITIES. HARD TIMES FOR THESE
TIMES 7 (Globe ed., Cambridge: Riverside Press 1869) (1859).
3. The pendulum-like shifts in federal Indian law make the paradoxes in Dickens's novel an attractive
allusion. See Kyle S. Conway, Student Author, A Tale of Two Sovereigns: The Implications of Dairyland
Greyhound Park,Inc. v. Doyle on Tribal and State Self-Government, 2007 Wis. L. REv. 1313; Karen Cordry, A
Tale of Two Sovereigns: Will the Bankruptcy Code Survive Seminole?, No. 5 NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER I
(1996); Amanda M. Murphy, Student Author, A Tale Of Three Sovereigns: The Nebulous Boundaries of the
Federal Government, New York State, and the Seneca Nation of Indians Concerning State Taxation of Indian
Reservation CigaretteSales to Non-Indians, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2301 (2011).
4. See generally Carol Tebben, An American Trifederalism Based upon the ConstitutionalStatus of Tribal
Nations, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 318 (2003).
5. In keeping with an emerging custom within the field, the word Tribal is capitalized when referring to
Native peoples as peoples, as is customary when referring to other ethnic and national groups around the world.
It is presented in lower case when referring to contemporary governments and court systems. The word Indian
is used primarily in its form as a term of art under federal law. At the same time, that practice is not intended
in any way to suggest that there exists a predominant pan-Indian culture or ethnicity.
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Tribal cooperation in some jurisdictions. It seems that we are poised at a juncture in the
story of these two types of sovereigns where the states and Tribes must decide which
path to take. Will our courts continue the "deadliest enemies" model6 bequeathed to
them from the violent eras of colonization, dominion, and assimilation, or will they
gradually continue to enter a "season of Light?"
The opening lines of Dickens's classic novel invoke the period surrounding the
French Revolution. The two cities were Paris and London, and Dickens's novel served as
a warning to English leaders that their extravagance in class domination could lead to
retaliatory upheaval on the part of the masses - perhaps even violent upheaval. The
author's warning is no less valid today. And although, as Professor Matthew Fletcher
has noted, the risk to states of continuing the "deadliest enemies" model of state-Tribal
relations is no longer armed conflict, 7 the price of grinding poverty, ill health, and
threatened cultural institutions within each state's Tribal communities is no less a threat
to state and tribal communities alike.
This article aims to further the understanding - already articulated by Judge
David Raasch and others - that the extent to which Tribal-state court relations succeed
or fail depends in large part upon individual judges' ability to understand each other's
philosophical, legal, and historical realities and orientations, and to build relationships of
mutual respect and trust.8 It is not news to most Indigenous communities that harmony
- and indeed, all of life - is based upon a strong foundation of relationship ties and
mutual responsibilities. 9 But while interpersonal relationship-building may be instinctive
for many non-Indian actors in the Anglo-American judicial system, it is often overlooked
as a tool for institutional relationship-building by those same actors because it is so deemphasized in Western legal culture and in American popular culture.
Another purpose of this Article is to bring together a healthy cross-section of
options for Tribal and state court cooperation, while at the same time recognizing that the
ultimate goal has more to do with using those cooperative instruments as bridges to
lasting trust. In that sense, this Article proposes those methods as bridges to a more
organic, flexible system of cooperation based upon communication between judges and
officials.
As with all issues involving the colonization of Native peoples, the problem of
Tribal-state court cooperation cannot be separated from its historical context. This article
will proceed by briefly exploring the roots of Tribal-state tensions, and then examining
how those tensions continue to express themselves in interactions between judicial
systems. The second half of this article will describe opportunities for collaboration and
cooperation between tribal and state courts, as well as the risks that remain in engaging
- or failing to engage - one another on tense issues like jurisdiction. Finally and most
importantly, it will report how pioneering judges like Judge Raasch, former Chief Judge

6. See generally Matthew L. M. Fletcher, Retiring the "Deadliest Enemies" Model of Tribal-State
Relations,43 TULSA L. REv. 73 (2007).
7. Id. at 77-80.
8. See Paul Stenzel, Full Faith and Credit and Cooperation Between State and Tribal Courts: Catching
Up to the Law, 2 J. COURT INNOVATION 225, 226 (2009) ("[T]he application and carrying out of the law is not
a mechanical procedure, but relies on shared human understanding and trust.").
9. CHAMPAGNE, supranote 1, at 9-21.
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of the Stockbridge-Munsee Band of Mohicans Tribal Court,] 0 have discovered that the
need for formal structures eventually becomes secondary to the ability to resolve
tensions through consensus:
[A]any people think there has to be legislation or formal agreements,
MOUs, MOAs, or protocols. Basically, [it comes down to] the simple
thing that you and I are doing now we're talking.... [W]e don't
have to agree on everything, but we'll understand everything better
and we'll understandeach other and we can still work together . .. to
respond to the needs of the community or the people we're working
with[]n
SOURCES OF TENSION

A Season of Darkness: The Ravages of Colonization
After the soldiers had killed all but some little children and babies still tied up in
their baskets, the soldiers took them also, and set the camp on fire and threw them into
the flames to see them burn alive. I had one baby brother killed there. My sisterjumped
on father's best horse and ran away. As she ran, the soldiers ran after her; but thanks be
to the Good Father in the Spirit-land, my dear sister got away. This almost killed my
poor papa. Yet my people kept peaceful. ...

-Sarah Winnemucca (Paiute) 12
In the beginning, Indian-European relations were shrouded in darkness. That
darkness continues into the present time in many ways, alongside some gradual
enlightenment. Centuries of warfare and genocide 1 3 against North American Indigenous
peoples have left behind many scars and traumas, 14 which will take even more centuries
to heal. The sources of historical tension between present-day American Indian nations
and neighboring states, which arose primarily from European settlement, have their roots
in this violence and trauma, which began with the Conquest model of early exploration

10. Judge Raash is now a faculty member in the National Judicial College and the Fox Valley Technical
College Criminal Justice Center for Innovation. He is Vice President of the Tribal Law and Policy Institute and
a past president of the Wisconsin Tribal Judges Association.

STOCKBRIDGE-MUNSEE COMMUNITY BAND OF

MOHICAN

DAVID

INDIANS,

MEET

OUR

ELDERS:

RAASCH,

http://www.mohican-

nsn.gov/Community/Meet Our Elders/raaschdavid.htm (last visited July 27, 2011).
11. Interview by Aaron Arnold with David Raasch, Judge, Stockbridge-Munsee Tribal Court, Bowler,
Wisconsin (Oct. 2009), in 2:2 J. COURT INNOVATION 381, 384-85 (Oct.2009) [hereinafter INTERVIEW].
12.

PETER NABOKOV, NATIVE AMERICAN TESTIMONY: A CHRONICLE OF INDIAN-WHITE RELATIONS FROM

PROPHECY TO THE PRESENT, 1492-1992 199 (1991) (quoting SARAH WINNEMUCCA, LIFE AMONG THE PAIUTES

(1883) (providing her first-person account of a massacre in Dayton, Nevada in 1864-65)).
13. See generally Sarah Deer, Relocation Revisited: Sex Trafficking of Native Women in the United States,
36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 621, 630, n. 40 (2010) (citing Lindsay Glauner, The Needfor Accountability and
Reparation: 1830-1976: The United States Government's Role in the Promotion, Implementation, and
Execution of the Crime of Genocide Against Native Americans, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 911 (2002); Rose Weston,
Facingthe Past, Facing the Future: Applying the Truth Commission Model to the Historic Treatment ofNative
Americans in the United States, 18 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1017 (2001)) (arguing that the massacre, forced
assimilation, relocation, and other treatment of North American Indigenous peoples constitutes genocide under
conventional standards).
14. Maria Yellow Horse Brave Heart & Lemyra M. DeBruyn, The American Indian Holocaust: Healing
Historical Unresolved Grief 8 J. NAT'L CENTER FOR AM. INDIAN & ALASKA NATIVE MENTAL HEALTH RES.

60, 75 (1998) (cited by Deer, supra note 13, at 630 n. 439).
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and settlement. Legally, that model is expressed in the Doctrine of Discovery, which
holds - and continues to hold to this day in the United States and throughout most of
the colonized world - that Christianized, European sovereigns acquired a superior
divine, moral, and legal "future right" in aboriginal lands, including the first right to
engage Indigenous peoples for formal land acquisition. 15 In its even darker form, it
imbued colonists like Hernando de Soto with a sense of right and duty to forcibly and
brutally seize those lands when they did not get their way.16 Before embarking on a
collaborative enterprise, representatives from state jurisdictions must acknowledge the
dark underpinnings of state-tribal relations and their counterparts' justifiable distrust.17
In the early years of the Union, hostilities between the states (and their settlers) and
the tribes were so great, both in terms of violence and abuses of trade and government,
that the founders built an exclusive right to Indian trade and relations into the federal
Constitution.18 Further, a very young United States Supreme Court was forced to step in
early on to prevent a Constitutional crisis between Congress and the State of Georgia,
holding in Worcester v. Georgia that Georgia could not enforce a law preventing "white
persons" from living within the Cherokee Nation. 19 Georgia's effort threatened not only
the federal system, but also the very political sovereignty of American Indian nations. As
a consequence of the federal government winning the tug-of-war for exclusive control
over relations with Indian tribes, state-tribal relationships necessarily became more
opposed. 20
Hostilities were not merely jurisdictional in nature. The reality is that the settlers'
hunger for more territory drove local and national Indian policy, including many welldocumented massacres21 by local residents and by the United States Army. In the
testimony of Sarah Winnemucca, quoted above, she describes the brutal murders of her
tribe members at Dayton, Nevada, ostensibly over some stolen cattle. Many, many more
were killed through intentional neglect by reservation agents who stole the basic food,
shelter, and clothing promised to the people by treaty, leaving them to suffer and die

15. Robert J. Miller, The Doctrine ofDiscovery in American Indian Lawu, 42 IDAHO L. REv. 1, 5-7 (2005).
16. Id. at 7-8 ("A close look at the origins and development of this 'legal' doctrine does leave one thinking
more of the adage 'might makes right' than of the principled development of law in an insular society where all
the people share the rights and obligations of the law. In fact, a 'cynic' might conclude that the legalistic,
international law Doctrine of Discovery was nothing more than an attempt to put a patina of legality on the
outright confiscation of almost all the assets of the people of the New World.").
17. See Ethan Plaut, Tribal-Agency Confidentiality: A Catch-22 For Sacred Site Management?, 36
ECOLOGY L.Q. 137, 143 (2009) (noting that distrust resulting from historical tensions play a large role in the
tribes' hesitance to consult with federal agencies regarding projects that will impact sacred sites).
18.

ROBERT T. ANDERSON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY 31 (West 2d ed.

2010) (explaining that James Madison led the effort behind the Indian Commerce Clause in Article 1,Section 8
in order to put an end to state forays into this federal domain).
19. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832) (discussed in ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 18, at 62-74).
20.

CORNTASSEL

& WITMER,

FORCED FEDERALISM:

CONTEMPORARY

CHALLENGES TO

INDIGENOUS

NATIONHOOD 82 (2008).
21.

See ROBERT HAYS, EDITORIALIZING "THE INDIAN PROBLEM": THE NEW YORK TIMES ON NATIVE

AMERICANS, 1860-1900 207-31 (paperback ed. 2007). Particularly well-known examples are the Sand Creek
(Southern Cheyenne Nation), Bear River (Shoshone Nation), and Wounded Knee (Lakota Nation). The
brutality of the U.S. "Indian wars" was also quite well-known, and the subject of many editorials at the time, as
well as a growing divide over the "Indian problem" between the urban East and the frontier West. See id. at
127-69.
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from disease, starvation, and exposure.22
These atrocities are not mere relics of the wild frontier. Unspeakable suffering
resulted from removal policies designed to seize Indian lands by moving the people to
distant reservations in unfamiliar territories; newcomers to the field will be familiar with
the Cherokee "Trail of Tears" as a prime example. Just as insidious were the forced
assimilation policies that wrested Indian children from their families and placed them
into boarding schools, in many cases for cultural re-education,23 forced religious
conversion, and the like. On the heels of the assimilation era came the allotment era, in
which many reservations were rationed out into parcels to certain Indian citizens, with
the "left-over" parcels granted to non-Indian settlers. One of the deeper injuries to result
from allotment was the drastic cultural shift from communal to private ownership,
causing great damage to Native communities, families, and lifeways.
In recent decades, even on the heels of the tribal self-determination era, which
ushered in a resurgence of tribal governments, codification, strengthened sovereignty,
and proliferate tribal justice systems, tribal sovereignty continues to come under attack.
For the last twenty five to thirty years, the United States Supreme Court has been quite
focused upon - and harsh towards - Indian interests, particularly in eroding tribal
jurisdiction.24 In other state and federal courts and legislatures, the results tend to be
more mixed. Some, like Oklahoma, have poor records, but others are more
encouraging.25
This is the soil in which the seeds of tribal-state court collaboration and
cooperation must somehow grow.26 Two main cultural barriers to communication can, if
left unattended, prevent meaningful cooperation from taking place, threatening the health
of Indigenous communities. First, historical myths and prejudices about Native peoples,
which stem from the earliest days of native-colonial conflict form the root of modern,
anti-Tribal policies, legislation, and court decisions that threaten to keep Native
communities in poverty and marginalization. Philosophically, animosity and distrust
stem from the orientation of colonizing powers toward Indigenous peoples as inscrutable
"savages." 2 7 Arguably, this historical fear and loathing - whether conscious and
22. Cf NABOKOV, supra note 12, at 187-202 (providing firsthand Indian testimony about the atrocities
perpetrated by dishonest, and often brutal, reservation agents).
23. There are some exceptions, such as the Chickasaw Nation-run Bloomfield Academy for Girls, and of
course the accounts of Indian people who found their educations to be a positive experience helping them to
advance in life. See generally AMANDA J. COBB, LISTENING TO OUR GRANDMOTHERS' STORIES: THE
BLOOMFIELD ACADEMY FOR CHICKASAW FEMALES, 1852-1949 (2000). For a great number of others

throughout the United States, Canada, and Australia (who modeled their programs after the Americans'), it was
a brutal, traumatizing, abusive experience. Lorie M. Graham, Reparations,Self-Determination, and the Seventh
Generation, 21 HARV. HuM. RTS. J. 47, 51-55, 67-70, 72-73 (2008) (providing examples of those abuses).
24. See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Courts Indian Problem, 59 HASTINGS L. J.579,
583-84 (2008).
25.

See

generally

TURTLE

TALK

BLOG

-

STATE

SUPREME

COURT

OUTCOMES,

http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/././ ?s-state+supreme+court+outcomes (last visited Mar. 4, 2012).
26. See Hope M. Babcock, A Civic-Republican Vision of "Domestic Dependent Nations" in the TwentyFirst Century: Tribal Sovereignty Re-envisioned, Reinvigorated, and Re-empowered, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 443,
503-9.
27. Cf Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 590 (1823) ("But the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country
were fierce savages, whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the forest. To
leave them in possession of their country, was to leave the country a wilderness; to govern them as a distinct
people, was impossible, because they were as brave and as high spirited as they were fierce, and were ready to
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individually held, or subconscious and collectively held - often results in the
devaluation of tribal governments and courts by their Anglo-American counterparts.
Both spiritually and pragmatically, the gulf between Indigenous and Western
thinking in our plural society arguably also results from an ideology of scarcity28
a
type of poverty of thinking that causes conflict over resources. This poverty mentality
can be seen in other political issues like immigration, but has a tendency to manifest in
current state-Tribal affairs as conflict over gaming, taxation, and other forms of Tribal
economic development and survival. One archetype that contributes to this form of
conflict and misunderstanding is the "rich Indian" archetype.29 In order for states and
Tribes to enter the best of times, they must explode those myths and create new
narratives.
Second, another source of state-Tribal tension is a clash of political philosophies
stemming from differing worldviews. From the Euro-American standpoint, state
government is a health, safety, and welfare regime designed to keep public order, and
sovereignty connotes a mere political subdivision within the larger federal system. From
the Native American standpoint, sovereignty is both political and cultural, and
govermnent is "interwoven with the social, spiritual, intellectual, and economic aspects
of the communities they serve." 30 For states and their courts to create law that protects,
rather than undermines, their neighboring Native communities, their actors must
understand comparative state and Tribal sovereignty. They must also contemplate what
every chip carved from Tribal sovereignty means to Native peoples in terms of their
cultural survival.
To be sure, each party to a relationship bears responsibility for listening to the
concerns of the other and to recognizing its right not only to exist, but to benefit from the
relationship - to thrive. Because state governments enjoy the vastly greater balance of
power within the two-sovereign relationship, they historically have had the least
incentive to come to the table with open hearts and minds, even when individual
delegates are willing to do so. Furthermore, despite the much greater incentive for Tribes
to cooperate with States, their too old wounds may be slow to heal, making it difficult to
trust. 3 1
An Age of Wisdom and Foolishness: Tribaland State Sovereigns Today
Today, federal law recognizes that Native American nations have a unique brand
of sovereignty called the "domestic dependent nation."32 Under this federally-created
doctrine, the approximately five hundred and sixty-five American Indian nations that are
recognized by the United States 33 in a given year are, as a very general matter,
repel by arms every attempt on their independence.").
28. Mary Christina Wood, The Politics ofAbundance: Towards a Future of Tribal-State Relations, 83 OR.
L. REV. 1331, 1335 (2004).
29. See CORNTASSEL & WITMER, supra note 20, at 3.

30. Angelique A. EagleWoman (Wambdi Awanwicake Wastewin), The Philosophy of Colonization
Underlying Taxation Imposed upon Tribal Nations within the UnitedStates, 43 TULSA L. REV. 43, 44 (2007).
31. SUSAN JOHNSON, GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT: MODELS OF COOPERATION BETWEEN STATES AND
TRIBES 8 (2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter MODELS OF COOPERATION].
32. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
33. See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible To Receive Services From the United States Bureau of
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empowered to self-govern as to intra-tribal affairs within their borders. In criminal
matters, tribal courts may prosecute misdemeanors between Indian people. They also
legislate for the health, safety, and welfare of their peoples, subject to a morass of often
paternalistic federal regulations. 34 Interestingly, the tribes' ability to govern in civil
matters affecting their communities becomes frustratingly complex when non-Indian
parties (read: parties from the dominant/"superior" culture, race and religion) - are
involved. 35
Most tribal law and Indian law scholars agree that tribal sovereignty stems from an
inherent, natural right to self-determination that predates contact with Europeans,36 and
was also validated by Europeans in the early era of government-to-government
relations. 37 But in terms of the current legal reality, tribal political sovereigns exist at the
sufferance of Congress, under the federal plenary power doctrine. Federal Indian law
scholars also tend to agree that the plenary power doctrine is inconsistent with
Constitutional history and legal precedent, 3 8 but that it nonetheless remains the law of
the land, as well as the political reality for any foreseeable future. From a historically
accurate viewpoint based on the law of treaty, tribes actually should be treated more like
inherent sovereigns who ceded powers to the national sovereign only by agreement (and
more typically, by sheer coercive force). 39
In addition to political sovereignty, Native American nations also hold as
inalienable a type of natural right to self-determination often known as inherent or
cultural sovereignty, which "encompasses the spiritual, emotional, mental, and physical
aspects . . ." of Native American lifeways.40 Indigenous cultural sovereignty has no

observable counterpart in modern Western political philosophy, which emphasizes the
role of government and society to maximize the destiny of the individual citizen. While it
is irresponsible and unrealistic to force generalizations about Native American culture,
Native scholars do tend to agree that core distinguishing characteristics include the
preeminence of relationship and kinship - among the members of a particular tribe,
between Native peoples, and between the people and the natural world, both seen and
unseen. 41
In both comparison and contrast, American political thought views states
somewhat paradoxically as either pure political subdivisions of an indivisible national

Indian
Affairs,
75
Fed.
Register
60810
(2010),
available
at
http://www.bia.gov/idc/groups/xofa/documents/document/idc012038.pdf (last accessed June 10, 2011).
34. Cf, e.g., Anna Fleder & Darren J. Ranco, Tribal Environmental Sovereignty: Culturally Appropriate
Protection or Paternalism? 19 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 35 (2005) (describing federal environmental
procedures affecting tribes as difficult and "potentially paternalistic" due to their foreign "cultural norms").
35. See, e.g., INTERVIEW, supra note 11, at 381 ("The biggest obstacle that I see in tribal courts today is
they lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians . . . .").
36. Wallace Coffey & Rebecca Tsosie, Rethinking the Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine: Cultural Sovereignty
and the Collective Future of Indian Nations, 12 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 191, 210 (2001).
37. See generally Robert N. Clinton, There is No FederalSupremacy Clausefor Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 113 (2002).
38.

Id. at 133-34.

39. See generally id
40. Coffey & Tsosie, supra note 36, at 210.
41.

C.E. MERRIAM, JR., HISTORY OF THE THEORY OF SOVEREIGNTY SINCE ROUSSEAU 84-85 (Kitchener ed.,

Batoche Books 2001) (1900).
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sovereign, or as the inherent, original, colonizing sovereigns of what is now the United
States, who ratified the Constitution in order to create a limited national government and
ceded only limited sovereign powers.42 Under the latter view, which certainly appears
most consistent with U.S. political and legal history, 43 the states retain all unceded
sovereign powers within a federal system of divisible sovereign powers. 44 According to
conventional understanding, during the Revolutionary period, Anglo-American political
philosophy maintained that local control is less prone to the abuses of power.45 Thus,
when states joined the Union, new states retained remaining aspects of the greater,
sovereign whole.46 The Civil War naturally caused a shift in political philosophy away
from the idea of divisible sovereignty and toward an indivisible sovereign state in the
form of the dominant, national, United States government. 47
Although it can be dangerous to draw direct parallels between the state and Tribal
sovereign experience,48 some important (albeit highly generalized) analogies and
distinctions can help states and tribes understand each other better on a government-togovermnent basis. First, despite the undeniable reality of federal supremacy, tribes and
states may perceive each other on a diplomatic level as general sovereigns with the right
to self-determination for their communities. 49 From a second, cultural standpoint, the
differences are much more vast: cultural differences between many states and the federal
government tend to stem from regional interests and from Civil War era divisions over
slavery and race, but still generally participate in the same unifying, Anglo-American
legal and political culture. Although the primacy of cultural sovereignty to Tribal selfdetermination presents a cosmological barrier to communication between citizens of
states and Tribes, increased understanding of the concept may help state actors to
understand the vast importance of respect for difference in their diplomatic relations.
An Epoch of Incredulity: State JudicialEncroachment, the Failure of Comity,
and the "Savage Other" Archetype
One of the most profound expressions of a sovereign's power to manage the affairs
of its own people is the exercise of civil and criminal jurisdiction. In the past few
decades, tribal courts have experienced explosive growth, hearing complex cases and
responding to federal pressure to maintain many aspects of Anglo-American

42. See Judith Resnick, Multiple Sovereignties: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Government, 79
JUDICATURE 118, 125 (1995).
43. MERRIAM, supra note 41, at 84; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 32 (Alexander Hamilton) (cited by
MERRIAM, supra note 41, at 84 (States were to "retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had, and
which were not, by that at, exclusively delegated to the United States.")).
44. See MERRIAM, supra note 41, at 85.
45. See id. at 82.
46. Id. at 85.
47. Id. at 171-82.
48. Carole Goldberg, Critique by Comparison in Federal Indian Law, 82 N.D. L. REV. 719, 727-29 (2006)
(warning that while the state comparison instructs that Tribes should share similar sovereign powers, it has also
been used detrimentally to impose the doctrine of federal plenary power over Tribes).
49. While the latter view holds the most promise for forging a beneficial state understanding of the Tribes'
analogous inherent sovereignty (and general jurisdiction), it also has negative connotations. Those negative
associations stem from the use of the "state's rights" movement to resist the national sovereign's anti-racist
initiatives during the civil rights era.
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jurisprudence, while also "crafting a unique jurisprudence of vision and cultural
integrity."50 Although there have been both wins and losses for tribal courts, scholars
generally agree that the net result is the unfortunate erosion of tribal jurisdiction. 5 1
Because the pattern of erosion makes so little sense when compared to how jurisdiction
is treated within the Anglo-American judicial system, it is difficult to find any unifying
theme other than a general misapprehension and distrust of Native American cultures
and their legal systems52
a byproduct of the archetypal categorization of Native
peoples as the "savage Other." 53 If that sad situation could be remedied through crosscultural dialogue, we may be able to enter into a new "season of Light" for tribal
sovereignty and tribal courts.
To confront the history of Indigenous-European relations requires courage. Only
relatively recently have Western nations begun to accept the darker sides of European
colonization, including the racist mindset that permitted legally sanctioned physical and
cultural genocide to occur around the world. 54 Of course, this type of racism and
genocide is not limited to European colonization; it is a part of most colonial conquests
in world history. 55 The focus here is on European colonization because it forms some of
the deepest hidden roots of the remaining state/tribal divide. At the heart of the colonial
mindset - past and present - is an orientation toward conquered peoples that
dehumanizes them in order to make their extermination or subjugation morally
palatable. 56 Dehumanization and the idea of "uncivilized" peoples as lesser beings form
the basis for colonial moral orientations like the doctrines of discovery and manifest
destiny. 57 For example, even commentators of the frontier era who criticized U.S. antiIndian policy obviously did so from a feeling of racial, cultural, and evolutionary
superiority. New York Times editorials from the 1800s at once criticize settlers and the
government, while referring to Native peoples as "'red-skins,' 'greasy red men,' 'lazy,'
'shiftless,' and 'dusky savages."'58 Similarly, the underlying narrative of the federal trust
doctrine is one of paternalism toward a lesser race unable to manage its own affairs
within "civilized" society. 59
This dehumanizing rationalization forms the basis for the us/them dichotomy
50. Frank Pommersheim, Tribal Courts: Providers of Justice and Protectors of Sovereignty, 79
JUDICATURE 110, 112 (1995).

51.
Indian
52.
53.

See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of
Tribal Authority Over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 6 (1999).
See generally Daan Braveman, TribalSovereigny: Them and Us, 82 OR. L. REv. 75 (2003).
See Rebecca Tsosie, Reclaiming Native Stories: An Essay on Cultural Appropriation and Cultural

Rights, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 299, 319-20 (2002).

54. See Andrea Smith, Heteropatriarchy and the Three Pillars of White Supremacy, in COLOR OF
VIOLENCE: THE INCITE! ANTHOLOGY 66, 67-69 (2006) (identifying a dual "Genocide/Colonialism" construct

as one of the three primary forms of White supremacism), cited in Terri Nilliasca, Some Women 's Work:
Domestic Work, Class, Race, Heteropatriarchy,and the Limits of Legal Reform, 16 MICH. J. RACE & L. 377,
385 (2011).
55.

PAUL

KEAL,

EUROPEAN

CONQUEST

AND

THE

RIGHTS OF

INDIGENOUS

PEOPLES: THE MORAL

BACKWARDNESS OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 35 (2003).
56. LINDA TUHIWAI SMITH, DECOLONIZING METHODOLOGIES: RESEARCH AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLE 26
(1999).
57. See generally STEVEN T. NEWCOMB, PAGANS IN THE PROMISED LAND: DECODING THE DOCTRINE OF
CHRISTIAN DISCOVERY (2008).

58.

HAYS, supranote 21, at 4.

59. Cf e.g., Fleder & Ranco, supra note 34, at 35.
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permeating U.S.-Tribal relations, not to mention other racist legal constructs like the
Dred Scott decision.60 Decisions on jurisdiction tend to center around the concept that
"'they' can exercise some degree of sovereignty only over 'themselves."'61 This
narrative is evident as recently as the 2001 Supreme Court decision in Nevada v. Hicks, 62
where the Court held that the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribal Court had no jurisdiction
over federal civil rights claims by a Tribal citizen against a federal game warden
conducting a search and seizure operation.63 The Court destroyed the presumption that
tribes have regulatory control - and thus jurisdiction - over non-member activities on
trust lands, instead holding that land ownership is merely one factor to be considered. 64
The Court even went so far as to hold that the Tribe had no inherent interest in nonmember activities on its own lands.65 From the perspective of sovereignty, this is
tantamount to telling states that they have no jurisdiction over torts occurring within their
boundaries.66 Because governments should normally enjoy jurisdiction over persons and
activities that affect their communities, the only identifiable reason for eroding
jurisdiction is the fear of the "savage Other." 67
Further evidence of the "savage Other" archetype at work is reflected in outsiders'
fear and mistrust of tribal courts themselves. They have been described as "makeshift,"
unfair, and biased. 68 But in fact, Tribal courts are dynamic, diverse, and, in some ways,
even superior to Western judicial systems in that they often emphasize restorative justice
over retributive, zero-sum outcomes.69 After all, it is our Tribal communities that have
inspired contemporary state and federal initiatives toward alternative dispute resolution,
such as mediation and drug court programs. 70 Contemporary tribal programs include
traditional practices, Peacemaking Circles, and Healing-to-Wellness courts. 7 1 At the
same time, tribal courts experience great pressure to conform their structures and laws to
the Anglo-American system.
Some pressure results from the vestiges of aggressive, assimilation-era programs
that promoted boilerplate tribal constitutions, as well as courts that operated as arms of
federal policy. 72 As a result, many tribal codes, government branches, and court systems

60.

SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG'S CASE: AMERICAN

INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL LAW, AND

UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 18 (1994).

61. Braveman, supra note 52, at 109.
62. 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
63. Id. at 356-57.
64. Id. at 360.
65. Id. at 359.
66. See id.
67. See Braveman, supra note 52, at 100-2.
68. See Nell Jessup-Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Tiventy Indian Tribal Courts, 22
Am. INDIAN L. REv. 285, 285-89 (1998).
69. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, INDIGENOUS JUSTICE SYSTEMS AND TRIBAL SOCIETY (Dec. 3,
2007), http://www.nij.gov/topics/courts/restorative-justice/perspectives/indigenous-tribal.htm
70. See Sandra Day O'Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts, 9 TRIBAL CT.
REC. 12, 14 (1996).

71. See JUSTIN B. RICHLAND & SARAH DEER, INTRODUCTION TO TRIBAL LEGAL STUDIES 313-15, 317
(2004).
72. E.g. Jessup-Newton, supra note 68, at 291 (discussing the Indian Reorganization Act of 1932 and the
Courts of Indian Offenses).
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mimic those of the surrounding states as a matter of survival, 73 as well as to fill the void
left by assimilation programs that attempted to obliterate Indigenous cultural practices.
Native American leaders and scholars are now encouraging Tribal communities to
consider, where possible, decolonizing their received Western law and systems in order
to reflect internal values and the customary law of that particular community. 74 As they
decolonize, outsiders may feel threatened by difference. Nevertheless, most
contemporary tribal law related to business, torts, and other matters affecting non-Indians
are very similar to their state counterparts' and are not impenetrable as feared.7 5
To counteract threats to legitimacy, many Native American Nations have
developed (and continue to develop) elaborate written codes, court decisions, and
constitutions. They also have training programs for the judiciary, advocates, and court
staff, as well as an increasing number of law graduates on the bench and in the bar. 76
Understanding occurs most readily where cultural values converge. 77 Where differences
manifest, it is important for outside institutions to orient by contemporary political
philosophy favoring mindful, engaged pluralism over assimilation, as well as to work
at acknowledging and overcoming stereotype and bias.
State communities, like other post-colonial governments around the world, have
inherited a collective colonial orientation that includes the "savage Other" construct.
While the last decade has seen a proliferation of cooperative initiatives, some hostility
remains. An extreme example is the "One Nation" group in Oklahoma. A more common
example is anger from some state citizens about Indian gaming and "preferential"
treatment. Both tribal and state actors must consider both inherent bias - as well as the
willingness to overcome it - when they make decisions affecting Indian country and
Native American people. To overcome this bias means to risk trusting that Native
American communities and courts are competent to self-govern, as well as to deal fairly
with non-members who avail themselves of the benefits of the jurisdiction, such as
tourism, doing business, gaming, and so on. 79 For Native communities, it is to risk being
betrayed yet again. It is often observed that the best way to increase trust and
understanding is to communicate, to visit each other's communities, and to form lasting
relationships between individuals. Without communication, the silence is "all too easily
filled with gossip, relentless stereotypes, and pernicious emptiness." 80

73. Id. at 294.
74. See, e.g., Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L. REV. 225,
241-43 (1994).
75. Cf id. at 262-63.
76. Id. at 237-44.
77. See generally Cynthia Lee, Cultural Convergence: Interest Convergence Theory Meets the Cultural
Defense, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 911 (2007); see also Braveman, supranote 52, at 116-17.
78. Cf generally Bill Ong Hing, Beyond the Rhetoric of Assimilation and CulturalPluralism: Addressing
the Tension of Separatism and Conflict in an Immigration-Driven MultiracialSociety, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 863
(1993).
79. See EVE DARIAN-SMITH, NEW CAPITALISTS: LAW, POLITICS, AND IDENTITY SURROUNDING CASINO
GAMING ON NATIVE AMERICAN LAND 66 (2004).

80. Frank Pommersheim, Tribal-State Relations: Hope for the Future?, 36 S.D. L. REv. 239, 273 (1991).
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OF HOPE: OPPORTUNITIES FOR COOPERATION

As the idea of building trust and understanding relates to the courts, the future
looks bright in some states. In fact, it may be that some state courts will take the lead in
demonstrating respect for tribal jurisdiction.81 One promising result of recent
cooperative movements has been the Civil Jurisdiction in Indian Country Project. 82
There are also a number of related Tribal/State court forums around the country,
developed in large part under the same initiative by the National Center for State Courts
and National Conference of Chief Justices. 83 For example, in the past decade, a number
of states have taken the positive step of including nearby neighboring tribal judiciaries in
their judicial councils and trainings. These relationships have developed better grounds
for understanding and cooperation, particularly for the recognition of each other's
judgments and orders. In a few of those states, such as Wisconsin and Arizona, tribalstate court cooperation has even resulted in formal court rules or statutes for the
recognition of judgments or for abstention of state court actions in cases involving
significant tribal law questions. 84
Through its National Tribal Judicial Center, the National Judicial College now
holds an annual "Walking on Common Ground" symposium to gather state, tribal, and
federal judges in the spirit of cooperation and improved understanding.85 The
symposium is organized around the reality that state courts and Tribal courts are most
likely to resolve jurisdictional differences and protect the integrity of their Native
communities when they open the lines of communication to establish agreements about
comity and full faith and credit for Tribal court judgments; share resources like jails,
court personnel, and probation officers; jointly develop legislation that contemplates
cooperation on Indian child welfare, taxation, and criminal law enforcement; and
promote awareness of Tribal affairs by the state bench and bar. 8 6
Yet another fruitful path for opening these intergovernmental and intercultural
discussions is the listening conference. In one example, the New York Federal-StateTribal Courts Forum, in conjunction with several other organizations, "convened state

81. And by taking the lead in respect for tribal jurisdiction, they shall take the lead in Tribal sovereignty
and Tribal communities.
82. Stanley G. Feldman & David L. Withey, Resolving State-Tribal Jurisdictional Dilemmas, 79
JUDICATURE 154, 155 (1995). The project began in 1988, when the Coordinating Council of the Association of
State Supreme Court Chief Justices became determined to improve jurisdictional relations between the two
types of court systems. Ralph W. Johnson & Rachael Paschal, Preface to TRIBAL COURT HANDBOOK FOR THE
26 FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED TRIBES IN WASHINGTON STATE (2d ed., Ralph W. Johnson & Rachael Paschal,

eds., 1992), available at http://www.msaj.com/papers/handbook.htm. By 1990, the project had established
"demonstration forums" in Washington, Arizona, and Oklahoma. Id. The forums "designed action agendas to
address disputed jurisdiction problems, including plans for developing educational programs, informal
meetings and working agreements, cross-visitations, exchanges of legal materials, agreements between tribal
governments and state executive agencies, state legislation and other approaches resulting from mutual
understanding and communication." Id.
83. James A. Bransky & Hon. Garfield A. Wood, The State/Tribal Court Forum: Moving Tribal and State
Courtsfrom Conflict to Cooperation, 72 MICH. BAR J. 420, 421 (1993).
84. See,

e.g.,

ARIZ.

STATE

TRIBAL

http://www.supreme.state.az.us/stfcf/handouts/rules
85.

CT.

CIV.

JUDGMENTS

RULES,

available

at

recognitn tribaliudgments.pdf.

NATIONAL JUDICIAL COLLEGE, WALKING ON COMMON GROUND: COOPERATION, COLLABORATION,

COMMUNICATION (2008).

86. Id.
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and federal judges and court officials in sessions with tribal judges, chiefs, clan mothers,
peacemakers, and other representatives from the justice systems of New York's Indian
Nations and Tribes, to exchange information and learn about [their] respective concepts
ofjustice."87
So far, this discussion has focused primarily on the state courts' responsibility to
cooperate with Tribal communities. However, the incentives to states are also manifold.
Court cooperation will reduce jurisdictional disputes.88 Abstention also will raise esteem
for Tribal courts. Moreover, the devolution of many federal programs to local
govermnent requires partnership between Tribes, states, and their subdivisions.89 Also,
the more matters that can be handled internally and with cultural sensitivity, the less the
burden on the state system, although it must be remembered that it takes time and
resources for tribal courts to assume larger roles where in the past there were not
resources or legal avenues for the courts to act in certain areas. Decolonizing the legal
system is a slow and complex process. Finally, whenever states promote the health and
independence of local Tribal communities, they further their own economic well-being.
In the last decade, the news from Indian Country is replete with stories about Tribal
contributions to local economies, not just through gaming, but through ever-diversifying
business interests. 90 These contributions can range in the millions to billions of dollars,
and bring new businesses and jobs to the surrounding communities.
Cooperationto Determine Questions of Tribal Law
Picture this: a state child protection agency files a juvenile dependency action in
state court. One of the parents whose rights may be terminated is an enrolled citizen of a
neighboring Native American nation. The children are also enrolled tribal citizens. Under
the Indian Child Welfare Act ("ICWA"), the tribe may have jurisdiction over the matter
in order to ensure that the children's place in their tribal community is properly
considered in any termination and placement determinations. Local tribal law must be
interpreted on the question of that nation's placement priorities, but the statute contains a
troubling ambiguity. Unlike federal court proceedings, this state has no abstention
doctrine in place to defer the matter to tribal court, and thus there is no tribal court record
available for assistance with determining questions of tribal law. The state court
determines that the tribe does not have jurisdiction, and thus refuses to apply ICWA or
the tribe's placement preferences.
Every day in the United States, state and federal courts grapple with such
interpretations of foreign law without resorting to certification, abstention, or
consultation agreements. But there is something different about tribal law, and it does not
have to do with the nature of the law itself. At least one scholar has noted reluctance

87. Marcy L. Kahn, Edward M. Davidowitz, & Joy Beane, Building Bridges Between ParallelPaths: The
First New York Listening Conference for Court Officials and Tribal Representatives, 78 N.Y. STATE BAR J. 10,
11(2006).
88.

MODELS OF COOPERATION, supra note 31, at 3-4.

89. Id., at 5.
90. See, e.g., Josh Lohmer, Tribes: A Neiw Era, STATE LEGISLATURES 20, 21 (Feb. 2009); Arun Rath, A
Nation,
NPR,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
Sovereign
(And
Successful)
Chickasaw
story.php?storyld 103348033 (last accessed Mar. 10, 2012).
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among Anglo-American courts not just to interpret tribal law, but even to recognize its
applicability.91 This reluctance probably stems in large part from ignorance of tribal law,
systems, and methods.
Tribes have governed their people since time immemorial in ways completely
foreign to those who came and settled the land. The same could be said for those who
brought their ideas of common law and western justice here. Oftentimes, these different
and competing ways of "doing justice" create inherent barriers for understanding and
acceptance. Many tribal justice systems have courts that very nearly mirror those of
states while others hold true to custom and tradition in a world that is moving quickly
away from traditional values and mores.92
Some courts' decisions also show a conscious disregard for tribal law and
jurisdictions, treating them as lawless, unprofessional, or merely inscrutable. 93 Tribal
and state courts may wish to work together to educate each other about their laws and
methods, and to form agreements for abstention, certification, or consultation in order to
ensure that each other's ways are properly used and respected.
Between the state and federal courts, there are four alternatives courts currently
used to avoid declaring the law of another sovereign: certification, prediction, abstention,
or stasis. 94 Stasis simply means that the deciding court will only apply currently
accepted doctrines, and will refuse to declare extensions of the law. 9 5 Under the
predictive approach, courts use their best efforts to analyze the approach that the other
sovereign's court would take.96 Abstention requires a stay while the foreign court
decides its questions of law, and certification permits those questions to be answered
with a shorter stay and without the need to transfer proceedings to the sister sovereign or
to wait for its lengthy progress through the path of appeal. 97 Until now, the focus on
tribal-state court relationships has been primarily upon developing respect for tribal
jurisdiction in those states where PL-28098 and other types of concurrent tribal and state
jurisdiction 99 do not apply. A few scholars have discussed the applicability of abstention
doctrines, certification rules, and choice of law rules to the determination of tribal law in
the courts of other sovereigns.
In her article proposing that states consider tribal law as a valid choice of law in
cases involving tribal interests, Professor Florey outlines a number of situations in which

91. Fletcher, supra note 24.
92. NATIONAL JUDICIAL COLLEGE, supra note 85, at 4.
93. American education, including legal education, bears some responsibility for permitting
misinformation, stereotype, and marginalization to persist concerning all matters Native American. That
neglect may take generations of faculty and students to change.
94. See Bradford R. Clark, Ascertainingthe Laws of the Several States: Positivism andJudicial Federalism
After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459, 1461-65 (1997).
95. Id. at 1463-64.
96. Id. at 1461.
97. Id. at 1462.
98. PL-280 is a federal enactment transferring jurisdiction over both criminal and civil tribal matters to state
courts in a handful of mostly Western states. In this area of robust tribal courts and lawmaking, the law is
considered outdated. Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006), 25
U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (2006), 28 U.S.C. §1360 (2006)).
99. Kansas has its own statute providing for concurrent jurisdiction. Kansas Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3243 (2006).
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tribal law questions have arrived in state, rather than federal, courtrooms. 100 Two cases,
one in New Mexico and one in Arizona, involved suits in state court for contract claims
and counterclaims arising out of an automobile purchase on state territory, followed by a
repossession on tribal land. 101 In one, the New Mexico Supreme Court remanded the
case back to the state trial court to determine whether choice of law principles required
the application of Navajo Nation statues. 102 In the other, the Arizona Court of Appeals
observed that comity might otherwise call for the application of tribal law, but that the
parties had expressly chosen Arizona law to govern any dispute under the terms of their
agreement.1 0 3
Using the South Dakota Supreme Court's decision in Risse v. Meeks, Professor
Florey describes the unique problems that territorial contacts can raise in choice of law
questions in Indian country. 104 In that case, a non-Indian plaintiff sued Oglala Sioux
citizens for trespass by cattle, and sought punitive damages for failure to construct a
fence.1 05 While the trespass occurred on state lands, the missing fence would have been
a fixture attached to a tribal allotment.106 Thus state law would apply to the underlying
claims, but tribal law would ostensibly apply to the punitive damages issue. Rather than
apply tribal law as a choice-of-law matter, the court decided that it would be more proper
to abstain and allow the tribal court to handle it. 0 7
Professor Florey also considers the major concerns scholars have raised about the
use of tribal law in state courts, concluding that they should not necessarily raise a bar to
the practice. First, tribal law scholars voice concern that non-Indian courts may
misunderstand tribal law that is based on different cultural norms or legal
philosophies.108 However, many tribal law issues concern matters so internal, such as
causes of action purely under the tribal code, that they would never be filed in state
court.
Second, given the Supreme Court's drastic erosion of tribal jurisdiction,
particularly over non-Indian persons, it is fair to wonder whether it would also restrict
the application of tribal law to non-Indians in state court matters. 109 Professor Florey
points out that there is no current legal impediment: as long as the choice-of-law
methodology satisfies Due Process, it should not matter what jurisdiction's law is being
applied: the law of another state, the federal government, a tribe, or a foreign nation in
the international sense. 110 Professor Florey notes that although Strate v. A-]

100. Katherine J. Florey, Choosing Tribal Law: Why State Choice-of-Law Principles Should Apply to
Disputes ith Tribal Contacts, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1627, 1665-71 (2006).
101. See Tempest Recovery Servs. v. Belone, 74 P.3d 67 (N.M. 2003); Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., 571 P.2d
689 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977).
102. Tempest Recovery, 74 P.3d at 71.
103. See Brown, 571 P.2d at 695 .
104. Florey, supranote 100, at 1669, citing Risse v. Meeks, 585 N.W.2d 875 (S.D. 1998).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1694.
109. See Florey, supranote 100, at 1676-77.
110. See id. at 1677-79. The essential due process provisions of the United States Constitution's Bill of
Rights apply to Indian nations through the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (2006).
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Contractors and Montana v. United States112 are tremendously restrictive in terms of
tribal jurisdiction, they contain no express ruling that tribal law cannot govern
"nonmembers whose conduct has an effect on the well-being of tribes." 113 The language
of PL-280 itself contemplates the application of tribal law as it becomes more prolific
over time. It provides that tribal law will be given "full force and effect" in civil causes
of action "if not inconsistent with any applicable civil law of the state." 114 As Florey
and others caution, the language sounds very pro-tribal law, but has not been interpreted
to a significant degree,and will depend greatly upon whether "inconsistency" with state
law is given a broad or narrow reading. 115
Third, just because PL-280 commands that states have civil, as well as criminal
jurisdiction over suits arising in Indian country, this does not mean that those state courts
cannot apply tribal law. 116 In Bryan v. Itasca County, a case decided in 1976, before the
Supreme Court took a more decidedly anti-tribal turn, 117 the Court rejected Minnesota's
attempts to tax a Chippewa reservation resident, holding that PL-280 was designed not to
subject tribes to states' "full panoply of [state] regulatory powers," but rather merely to
provide a forum for "resolving private legal disputes between reservation Indians, and
between Indians and other private citizens." 1 18
Similar tribal issues have also arisen in Oregon and in other New Mexico cases. In
Warm Springs Forest Products, the Oregon Supreme Court, like the Arizona Supreme
Court in Brown, ultimately decided that the contract terms had selected Oregon law, but
the court was willing to address tribal law as the other viable candidate. 119 Two
additional New Mexico cases, Begay and Chischilly, address automobile repossession
cases. In consistent decisions from the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court,
respectively, it was held that where the vehicle was repossessed on the Navajo
Reservation, Navajo law applied,120 and where it was repossessed off the reservation,
Navajo law was inappropriate.121
One particularly striking example of tribal law in state court comes from the highly
publicized banishment case in the Washington Courts.122 In that case, two minor citizens
of Tlingit community robbed and brutally assaulted a pizza delivery driver in
Washington State.123 At the behest of a tribal elder, the state juvenile court judge was
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

520 U.S. 438 (1997).
450 U.S. 544 (1981).
Florey, supra note 100, at 1680.
Id. at 1683.
Id.

116. Id. at 1680.
117. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 24.
118. Florey, supranote 100, at 1681. quoting Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 383, 388 (1976).
119. Katherine C. Pearson, Departingfrom the Routine: Application of Indian Tribal Lawu under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 695, 717 (2000) (citing Warm Springs Forest Prods. Indus. v. Employee
Benefits Ins., 716 P.2d 740 (Or. 1986)).
120. Pearson, supra note 119 (citing Begay v. First Nat'l Bank of Farmington, 499 P.2d 1005 (N.M. Ct. App.
1972)).
121. Pearson, supra note 119, (citing General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Chischilly, 628 P.2d 783 (N.M.
1981)).
122.

JENNIFER A. HAMILTON, INDIGENEITY IN THE COURTROOM: LAW, CULTURE, AND THE PRODUCTION OF

DIFFERENCE IN NORTH AMERICAN COURTS 7- 23(2009).

123. Id. at 7.
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willing to consider the traditional tribal remedy of banishment in an effort to
accommodate the tribal court's emphasis on reconciliation.124 The case was not on
appeal from tribal court - only the federal trial courts can hear appeals from tribal court,
and even then, the appeals concern federal questions of law and tend to completely defer
to tribal courts on interpretations of their purely internal law.125 Because the case was
not on review, it actually represents a very unique and promising experiment in tribalstate court cooperation that resulted in some success but also some failure. 126
Tribal law questions typically come into federal court by three paths: by diversity
or collateral attack of a tribal jurisdiction under the tribal exhaustion doctrine, 127or
through the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). Professor Pearson cites two examples
from the District of New Mexico. In Cheromiah v. United States, the federal trial court
was the first to adopt tribal law as the law of the place under the FTCA, and rejected a
stricter interpretation that would limit the "law of the place" as requiring state, rather
than tribal law. 128 Because the harm in this medical malpractice action occurred at a
federally operated Indian Health Service hospital on the Acoma Pueblo's reservation,
Acoma Pueblo law applied.129 In contrast, the same court rejected tribal law as a
plausible "law of the place" under the FTCA, but, if federal choice-of-law rules dictated
New Mexico choice of law principles, the court conceded that New Mexico's choice of
law rules might permit the application of tribal law even if the FTCA itself did not. 130
In two controversial Ninth Circuit cases, it was recognized that the federal courts
could enforce tribal law when a tribe sues a non-Indian under a tribal ordinance. 131 In
that situation, the jurisdiction is not based on tribal territory but on the defendant's lack
of Indian status. 132 The cases were controversial for a number of reasons, including the
problem that their federal question jurisdiction appeared to rest only upon an anticipated
defense, and not upon a well-pleaded, federal claim in the complaint itself. 133 Of greater
concern for purposes of this article is the potential for erosion of tribal sovereignty and
tribal courts. 134
The preceding examples represent the unusual cases, but a number of
contemporary factors promise to bring tribal issues to state and federal forums much
more frequently. 135 They include, but are not limited to, tribal economic
development,136 devolution of federal services to the states, tort claims resulting from
entertainment and services provided on tribal lands, and the prolific renaissance in tribal
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 7-23.
127. Clinton supra note 37.
128. Pearson, supra note 119 (citing Cheromiah v. United States, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1302 (D.N.M.
1999)).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 737 (citing Louis v. United States, 967 F. Supp. 456 (D.N.M. 1997)).
131. Julie A. Pace, Note, Enforcement of TribalLaw in FederalCourt: Affirmation ofIndian Sovereignty or
a Step Backward Toward Assimilation?, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 435, 454-59 (1992).
132. Id. at 456 (citing Chilkat Indian Village v. Johnson, 870 F.2d 1469, 1474 (9" Cir. 1989)).
133. Id.
134. See id. at 465-67.
135. E.g. Florey supranote 100, at 1690.
136. E.g. id.
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codification, written tribal court decisions, 137 and digitization of primary tribal law. 138
Regarding the FTCA claims, Professor Katherine Pearson noted the potential scope of
medical malpractice litigation for Indian Health Service treatment in Indian Country (as
opposed to non-reservation, urban areas) given that IHS serves about 1.5 million people
and has an annual budget over $2 billion. 139
A recent development in New York-Australian court relations shows that a third
approach is possible: the development of inter-sovereign memorandums of
understanding for consultation on foreign law.
Just recently, the New York courts signed an historic memorandum of
understanding with the high court in Australia's New South Wales province. Rather than
a formal, international variety of certification, panels of judges in each jurisdiction will
volunteer non-binding, advisory assessments of their domestic law as a service to the
foreign court.
The agreement may face some obstacles to implementation, including the oftenignored federal constitutional prohibition against states' agreements with foreign
governments, as well as the constitutional preclusion of judicial branch advisory
opinions. Despite these challenges, the path-making agreement is being lauded as a very
positive step from a policy standpoint. Because New York is an international center for
business law and business disputes resolved in foreign courts often apply New York law
as the contractual choice of law, the new consultation system promises to promote
consistency and also to save litigants time and money. The state-tribal relationship has
similar constitutional restraints but also holds similar promise for increased efficiency,
and, much more importantly, increased recognition and respect for tribal courts and the
tribal laws they enforce.
Cooperationto Enforce Tribal Court Orders
Tribal advocates argue strenuously that federal and state courts should apply full
faith and credit to tribal court orders rather than mere comity-based principles.
Remarkably, however, tribal courts rarely grant full faith and credit to one another,
preferring comity instead. 140 Most tribal courts hold the power to view foreign tribal
court orders under the more discretionary principles of comity as an important
expression of their own tribe's sovereignty.141 For example, the Navajo Nation Court of
Appeals agreed with many federal and state jurisdictions when it held that the federal
Full Faith and Credit Act could not have contemplated the recognition of tribal court
orders - even by other tribes - because their courts, in the contemporary sense, did not
exist at the time of enactment.142 Professor Steven Gunn suggests that the ongoing
federal assault on tribal jurisdiction may have helped to foster an atmosphere in which
individual tribes' protection of their own sovereignty has had to become more important
137. Pearson supra note 119, at 706.
138. Florey supra note 100, at 1692.
139. Pearson supra note 119, at 699-700.
140. Steven J. Gunn, Compacts, Confederacies, and Comity: Intertribal Enforcement of Tribal Court
Orders, 34 N.M. L. REV. 297, 304 (2004).
141. See id.
142. Id. at 304 (discussing In re GuardianshipofCheiwhvi, 1 Navajo Rprt. 120, 125 (Navajo 1977)).
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than the cause of tribal sovereignty and courts generally.
For tribes, the recognition and enforcement of foreign orders involves a diminution
of tribal independence and a cession of authority to foreign governments. Naturally,
tribes are reluctant to cede any part of their governmental authority, since they have for
centuries witnessed the steady erosion of their authority over their territories and their
people. "Yet, such a cession of authority, if part of a reciprocal inter-governmental
enforcement regime, has the potential to expand the reach of tribal court judgments."1 43
The tribes' reluctance to engage each other on the level of full faith and credit may
also result from cultural and policy differences, much as it does at the federalinternational level. 144 The exceptions to the comity preference are some tribes who have
entered into reciprocal agreements for full faith and credit. 145 There are a number of
instances in Oklahoma, where a state statute also promises full faith and credit to tribes
who offer the state reciprocity.146 Only a rare few are willing to grant full faith and
credit in the absence of reciprocity. Among them is the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe,
which has recognized the promise of inter-tribal full faith and credit to enhance tribal
sovereignty through strength-in-numbers by increasing the number of other courts that
recognize their power and legitimacy. 14 7

Cooperationto Establish Jurisdiction:The Example of Wisconsin's Teague Protocol
Ifyou can dial the phone, you can do this.14 8
-The Honorable David Raasch
Before 2005, Wisconsin courts experienced profound failures in their ability to
serve residents whose legal matters spanned tribal and state jurisdictional lines. Like so
many states rich in Native American communities, Wisconsin judges, and judges in
neighboring tribal courts, struggled to trust one another's competency and vied for
control over cases. This was particularly so in cases critical to the public health, safety,
and welfare, such as criminal and family matters. All of that changed when one tribal
court judge and one state court judge started to talk.
In 1995, Judge David Raasch struck up a conversation with two state court judges
over, as he put it during the 2011 Walking on Common Ground Symposium, 149 coffee
and a sweet roll. One of those judges was the Honorable Edward Brunner of Wisconsin's
intermediate appellate court. Judge Raasch was interested in founding a tribal court at the

143. Id. at 306.
144. See id. at 306, 308-09.
145. Gunn, supra note 140, at 311, 314.
146. Id. at 314-15.
147. Eberhard v. Eberhard, 24 INDIAN L. RPTR. 6059, (Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Ct. App. 1997); Gunn,
supra note 140, at 314.
148. David Raasch, Judge, Oral Presentation before the National Tribal Judicial Center, Tribal/State/Federal
Judicial Symposium (notes on file with author).
149. Id.
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Stockbridge-Munsee Community, Band of Mohican Indians.150 He wanted to collaborate
with the state court judges to create half-day joint training for judges. That meeting
developed over the next several years into a series of joint trainings that were
uncharacteristically well attended by the state judges. In early 2000, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court invited area tribal court judges to the state judicial conference and even
provided some scholarship assistance to attend. In another year, when drastic budget cuts
caused the annual state judicial conference to be cancelled, some tribal courts banded
together in an extraordinary act of comity to host the conference at tribal expense. As the
relationship continued to develop, the federal government offered funding to continue
collaborative initiatives. As individual and institutional bonds strengthened, judges began
to call one another to confer over appropriate jurisdiction, not unlike the process
described in the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act. 15 1
Unsurprisingly, it did not take long for the courts' new culture of cooperation to
face its first great challenge. Teague v. Bad River Band of Lake Superior Tribe of
Chippewa Indians152 involved a dispute between a non-Indian employee and his tribal
employer. The courts of both sovereigns desired jurisdiction, and each had a significant
stake in the outcome. Very likely due to the improved climate of collaboration within the
wider judiciary, the Wisconsin appellate courts took the surprising stance that state
courts should exercise comity - "in the spirit of cooperation and not competition',153
by conferring to determine jurisdiction according to a set of basic principles. The case
had multiple appeals and endured for some time. During its lifetime, these basic
principles developed into a set of protocols agreed to by the state courts and five
Chippewa bands within Wisconsin. They are now famously called the Teague
Protocol, 154 and they have attracted significant positive attention in Indian Country.The
Protocol includes a number of factors.155 Its primary, operative provisions call for a
150. Id
UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ENFORCEMENT ACT §101, 9 U.L.A. 66 (1999).
152. 665 N.W.2d 899 (Wis. 2003).
153. Id at 918.
154. See generally Bryan Cahill, Teague v. Bad River Band of Lake Superior Tribe of Chippeiva Indians:
Bringing the FederalExhaustion Rule of TribalRemedies Home to Wisconsin Courts, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 1291.
155. The Protocol is now codified at Wis. Stat. Ann § 801.54 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Act 119) and
lists eleven factors:
(a) Whether issues in the action require interpretation of the tribe's laws, including the tribe's
constitution, statutes, bylaws, ordinances, resolutions, or case law.
151.

(b) Whether the action involves traditional or cultural matters of the tribe.
(c) Whether the action is one in which the tribe is a party, or whether tribal sovereignty,
jurisdiction, or territory is an issue in the action.
(d) The tribal membership status of the parties.
(e) Where the claim arises.
(f) Whether the parties have by contract chosen a forum or the law to be applied in the event of a
dispute.
(g) The timing of any motion to transfer, taking into account the parties' and court's expenditure
of time and resources, and compliance with any applicable provisions of the circuit court's
scheduling orders.
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temporary stay and a conference between judges. The judges' deliberations are sealed
from the record. The Protocol also contains a creative tie-breaking mechanism not unlike
those commonly found in contract clauses for the selection of a neutral arbitrator or
mediator. In the event of a tie, the judges choose a third judge to finally decide the
matter.
The Teague Protocol is a remarkable example of comity put into practice. As
Judge Brunner described it:
Comity is all about respect for the two sovereigns. It's the development of an
idea in the spirit of cooperation. And the recognition that each sovereignty has
its own laws and those laws are approved by its people. Comity only works if
you accept the differences that each sovereign has and their various legal
processes. Comity is supposed to respect and allow for these differences.
Foremost, it needs to have due regard for the rights of the citizens of each
sovereign.156
Although the Teague Protocol is coming under increasing scrutiny from three
dissenting justices of the Wisconsin Supreme Court,15 Judge Brunner's outlook
demonstrates the potent rewards that flow when members of the dominant society work
to overcome the common fears and stereotypes associated with tribal peoples,
communities, and courts.
Cooperation Through TribalLaw Abstention Agreements
A number of tribal and federal Indian law scholars recommend that states develop an
exhaustion or abstention doctrine similar to that used in federal courts, and often with
some improvements for the added protection of tribal sovereignty.158 "[T]ribal court
judgments far more frequently will be taken to state courts, rather than federal courts for
enforcement, given the jurisdictional limitations of the federal courts ... .. 159 In a
(h) The court in which the action can be decided most expeditiously.
(i) The institutional and administrative interests of each court.
(j) The relative burdens on the parties, including cost, access to and admissibility of evidence, and
matters of process, practice, and procedure, including where the action will be heard and decided
most promptly.
(k) Any other factors having substantial bearing upon the selection of a convenient, reasonable
and fair place of trial.
See also The Honorable Robert A. Blaeser & Andrea L. Martin, Engendering Tribal Court/State Court
Cooperation,
BENCH
&
BAR
OF
MINN.,
Dec.
2006,
http://www.mnbar.org/benchandbar/2006/decO6/tribal-court.htm.
156. Tony Anderson, State, tribal courts signjurisdictionalagreement, WISLAWJOURNAL.COM, Aug. 2005,
http://wislawjournal.com/2005/08/03/state-tribal-courts-sign-jurisdictional-agreement/
(last visited Mar. 11,
2012).
157. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Wisconsin Supreme Court Narrowly Reaffirms Discretionary Transfer
Statute
(Former
Teague
Protocol),
TURTLE
TALK
(July
28,
2011),
http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/20 11/07/28/wisconsin-supreme-court-narrowly-reaffirms-discretionarytransfer-statute-former-teague-protocol/.
158. See Pace supra note 131, at 468.
159. Id. at 61 (noting that a strong argument exists that the principles of comity to be applied to tribal court
judgments may actually rightly be a matter of state law, according to the location in which the federal court
sits).
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handful of non-PL280 states, some courts now emulate the federal example of abstention
or exhaustion for tribal law matters to varying degrees. As in the federal arena, these
doctrines are promising and often effective. However, they are not always faithfully
followed, and do not always result in greater respect for tribal law, sovereignty, or
jurisdiction.
In his 2004 article, Professor Robert Clinton exposes the colonial underpinnings
underlying the inception of the federal courts' tribal court exhaustion doctrine.160 In a
series of decisions since the mid-1980s, the federal courts have departed from seemingly
settled Supreme Court precedent recognizing Indian nations as something akin to U.S.
territories for purposes of applying full faith and credit to their court decisions, rather
than merely applying principles of comity.161 Instead, in National Farmers Union
Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe,162 the United States Supreme Court ignored its own
precedent and began the trend of applying only comity-based principles of recognition to
tribal court judgments.163 Under the National Farmers Union line of cases, tribal court
judgments and some orders are subject to appellate-like review in the federal district
courts when a party collaterally attacks tribal court jurisdiction.164 "In essence, in
National Farmers Union, the Court invented precisely the kind of collateral attack on a
final judgment of another sovereign that the long controversial writ of habeas corpus
provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254 authorize for collaterally attacking state
165
criminal convictions."
Even worse, it does so for civil cases - something that would never happen when
a state judgment is collaterally attacked. In that situation, the federal court would have to
defer to the state court's assessment of its jurisdiction.166 The Court's departure from a
nearly one hundred year old precedent has resulted in a serious demotion, wherein tribal
courts are treated more like foreign international governments rather than as unique
sovereigns within the larger domestic, federal system.167 Since the exhaustion doctrine
became law, federal courts have tended to treat the review of tribal court judgments
under the rubric of standard of review, in quasi-appellate fashion, reviewing legal
determinations de novo, even when tribal jurisdiction was decided based on tribal law. 168
As Professor Clinton puts it, "[t]he difference in treatment of the judgment speaks
volumes about the levels of cooperation and respect, or lack thereof, between federal and
tribal courts." 169
While the question of whether the federal Full Faith and Credit Act applied, versus
mere comity, was not squarely presented to the Supreme Court in these earlier cases, the

160. See generally Robert N. Clinton, Comity & Colonialism: The Federal Courts' Frustrationof TribalFederalCooperation,36 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1 (2004).
161. Id. at 30-58.
162. 471 U.S. 845 (1985)
163. Clinton supra note 160, at 30-36.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 31.
166. Id. at 32-33.
167. Id. at 30-36.
168. Id. at 36.
169. Id.
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Ninth Circuit's contorted opinion in Wilson v. Marchingtonl7 held that only comity
applies.171 In that case, a Blackfeet tribal member sought to enforce a tribal court
judgment for damages in federal district court.172 The district court assented in an order
on summary judgment, holding that the federal act demanded full faith and credit for
tribal court judgments, given that the Supreme Court had previously recognized the
quasi-territorial status of tribes in this area of procedure.173 Reading several statutes
together, the Ninth Circuit noted that while a number of specialized enactments provide
full faith and credit for certain types of tribal court judgments, such as those under the
Indian Child Welfare Act, the general Full Faith and Credit Act did not. 174 The Court
ignored the fact that the Full Faith and Credit Act was enacted in 1790, before the advent
of tribal courts. 175 The jurisprudence supporting the federal tribal court exhaustion
doctrine evinces the type of xenophobia inherent in much federal jurisprudence
concerning Indian nations, such as the illogical notion that tribal courts should not have
jurisdiction over non-Indians acting within tribal territory. 176
The mere fact that a claim arises in Indian Country, involves Indians, or affects a
judgment issued by a tribal court does not create federal question jurisdiction. Thus, final
tribal judgments legitimately come into federal courts in one of two ways - either the
judgment winner in tribal court seeks enforcement of the judgment in federal court,
usually based on diversity jurisdiction, or the judgment loser wins the race to the federal
courthouse door and challenges the jurisdiction of the tribal court under the federal
common law cause of action [for the collateral attack of tribal court judgments] first
recognized in NationalFarmers Union. 177
Cooperation Through Certification of Questions of Law
Some scholars have offered certification as one vehicle for reducing concerns
about the proper application of tribal law in other sovereigns' courts.
Certification has
been promoted by the Uniform Law Commission and others as a much more efficient
way to seek assistance from another sovereign court's jurisdiction in determining
questions of law. For example, Pullman abstention in the federal courts requires the
federal litigation to be delayed while the parties pause - perhaps even for years - to let
state law questions play out in the state arena before returning to federal court to finally
resolve the dispute.179 Certification is typically adopted by statute and/or court rule,
170. 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997).
171. Clinton, supra note 160, at 44.
172. Id. at 39-40.
173. Id. at 40.
174. Clinton, supra note 160, at 42-43.
175. Id. at 42.
176. Id. at 52, 58.
177. Id. at 58.
178. Florey, supra note 100, at 1693; see also Pearson, supra note 119, at 741-72 (arguing that certification
remains the best way to recognize a tribe's interest in the litigation). See Pearson, supra note 119 at 744; Carol
Tebben, Trifederalism in the Aftermath of Teague: The Interaction of State and Tribal Courts in Wisconsin, 26
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 177, 185 (noting that certification would allow tribes to decide matters that directly affect
their own sovereignties); Pace, supra note 131, at 467-68.
179. E.g. David Roebuck, A PracticalMeans for Clarifying State Law, 18 JUST. Sys. J. 305, 305 (1996); see
also R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman, 61 S.Ct. 643, 645 (1941).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol47/iss3/8

24

Kowalski: A Tale of Two Sovereigns: Danger and Opportunity in Tribal-State
2012

A TALE OF TWO SOVEREIGNS

711

depending on state constitutional requirements.180 The great majority of states have
adopted a certification statute for interaction with the federal courts, many relying on the
language of the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act ("Uniform Act"). 181 The
Uniform Act permits the court receiving a certification request to reformulate the
question or even refuse to respond.182 Courts' response rates vary, from about ninety
percent in the Eleventh Circuit, to just over thirty percent in the Tenth. 183 Even at the
lower end of the scale, the response rate is rather high.1 84
One critic of the certification process argues that it unduly favors the federal courts
at the expense of the states.185 Professor Justin Long notes that the system permits
federal judges to delegate the dirty work of unraveling sometimes tedious state private
law questions, such as insurance regulation, to the state courts rather than reserving
certification for truly public questions, such as constitutional interpretation. 186 Professor
Long cites persuasive examples of the certification of some rather ordinary questions, as
well as unguarded comments from federal judges suggesting offense at a refused
question, or that the state judiciary lacks the caliber of the federal judiciary.187 The most
troublesome example may be similar comments made in a Fifth Circuit opinion and from
former Chief Justice Rehnquist, each revealing that they view certification as a way for
state courts to be of "help" or "aid" to the federal courts.1s While it is doubtless they
were well-meaning, such comments arguably place state courts in an inferior role, even
where questions of their own state laws are concerned.189 Further evidence of an
imbalance comes from the fact that in many states, answers to certified questions become
binding on state courts, but are often treated as advisory to the federal court deciding the
case.1 90 In contrast, Professor Cochran's study of the history of certification in Ohio
state and federal courts shows that comity usually results in respect for the state court's
opinion, with only one exception.191
In addition to concerns that certification lowers the state courts in the eyes of the
federal judiciary, Professor Long notes that the certification model itself belies an
outdated notion of dual sovereignty, when cooperative or interactive theories of
federalism are more contemporary and thus better accepted. 192 He contends that federal

UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW [ACT] [RULE] Prefatory Note (1967).
181. Richard Alan Chase, Note, A State Court's Refusal to Ansiwer Certified Questions: Are Inferences
Permitted?, 66 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 407, 409 (1992). The plain language of the Uniform Act can be found at
Roebuck, supra note 179, Appendix 2.

180.

182. UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW [ACT] [RULE] §§ 3, 4, (1995).
183. UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW [ACT] [RULE] Prefatory Note (1995).

184. Id.
185. See generally Justin R. Long, Against Certification, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 114 (2009) (offering
several reasons why certification may lower the esteem of state law and courts verses the federal).
186. Id. at 128-30.
187. Id. at 125-26.
188. Id. at 126-27.
189. See id at 125-27.
190. Long, supra note 185, at 140.
191. Rebecca A. Cochran, Federal Court Certification of Questions of State Law, to State Courts: A
Theoreticaland Empirical Study, 29 J. LEGIS. 157, 207-08 (2003).
192. Long, supra note 185, at 148-50; see also Clark, supra note 94, at 1461-62 (observing that Erie
described federalism in somewhat exclusive terms, emphasizing that "whether the law of the State shall be
declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern."
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courts should stop viewing state law as something inscrutable, exotic, and thus outside of
its purview. 193 He advises federal and state courts to reserve certification only for those
rare occasions when no positive state law exists from which the federal court could
fashion a cogent analysis. 194 Thus, his conclusion is not necessarily that certification
should be abandoned, but that it should be employed only under severe conditions, such
as a lack of positive law where no other interpretive methods will suffice, or where the
federal court has exclusive jurisdiction and the state court will never likely have an
opportunity to address the questions, such as in bankruptcy matters. 195
Here, what may result in a persuasive argument against certification in the statefederal context might then actually favor tribal courts, whose national governments are
indeed separate sovereigns and generally have had to fight very hard to protect and
promote their inherent sovereignty in the eyes of the federal government and fifty states.
If the criticism is that certification treats state law too much like "foreign law" with
unduly mysterious qualities,196 then certification may have the potential to increase
esteem and recognition of the tribes' quasi-foreign status, regardless of their colonial
status as domestic dependent nations.
Application of tribal law may foster a greater sense of cooperation between tribal
and state courts, permitting state courts a basic understanding of tribal procedures that
may help reduce suspicion and miscommunication when the state court is asked to grant
full faith and credit to tribal judgments or stay its proceedings in favor of a related suit in
tribal court. Such cooperation is likely to become increasingly important as tribes'
economic well-being becomes more and more dependent on finding fair and efficient
ways to resolve cases that span reservation boundaries. Both parties' interests are served
when the judicial system as a whole is able to minimize opportunities for forumshopping and inconsistent results. 197
Despite their initial recognition on an international, sovereign-to-sovereign level in
the treaty-making era, the crushing reality of colonial, imperial domination has demoted
tribes to the status of "domestic dependent nations" by unilateral imposition of United
States law. 198 Tribal nations are subject to Congressional plenary power, a loss of
jurisdiction in a number of areas, and other forms of federal regulation, sometimes
benign, but more often destructive. Nevertheless, the tribes retain political and cultural
sovereignty over a wide range of internal legal matters and persons - and should
arguably have power over much more.
If it is true that federal courts sometimes have a tendency to treat state law as
foreign in the inscrutable and exotic sense, then how foreign must tribal law seem where
the cultural differences that lend to varying legal interpretations are not merely regional
aspects of the same, dominant, Anglo-American culture, but truly ethnically distinct

(quoting Erie Ry. Co. v. Tompkins, 58 S. Ct. 817, 822 (1938))).
193. Long, supranote 185, at 169.
194. Id. at 169.
195. Id. at 167.
196. Id.
197. Florey, supranote 100, at 1691; see also Long, supra note 185, at 153-57.
198. Clinton, supra note 160, at n.48 (quoting Chief Justice Marshall in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. 1(1831)).
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communities with views that sometimes - but certainly not always - deviate
meaningfully from those of the dominant society? Professor Gloria Valencia-Weber
points to the example of differing tort standards used in some tribal jurisdictions. Some
tribes have codified a "carelessness" standard that looks like negligence but contains
nuanced differences. 199 The legacy of centuries of colonization, assimilation,
suppression, removal, and even genocide have led to "centuries of reasons for distrust of
'federal' decisions affecting [tribal] members, thus increasing the importance of getting
it right." 200
On the other hand when considering whether to adopt a certification system, the
stakes for tribal courts and the communities they represent are much greater and the
hostility from the other two sovereigns infinitely more severe.201 In states with existing
exhaustion and abstention doctrines, the ability to certify questions to tribal courts may
very well come to be seen as an easy and inexpensive way around those practices, even
when the tribal court has competent jurisdiction and the exercise of that jurisdiction is
important to protecting tribal sovereignty. Abstention currently affords tribal courts the
most control over how their law will be used in other courts. Under such a scheme, if
certification turns the answering court into a helper of the "elite" state or federal court,
tribal courts might be relegated to the role of judicial law clerk. And if, as Professor
Long argues, some judges truly do take personal offense at another court's refusal to
answer, will a tribal court's exercise of tribal sovereignty to refuse that question result in
even worse hostility? 2 02 Rather than attempting to make a blanket recommendation,
these are questions each tribal nation must address for itself, taking into account such
intimate, local factors as the strength of relationships between individual tribal and state
court judges, the success of other efforts at cooperation with state agencies, support in
the state legislatures for tribal initiatives, and so on.
Under the Uniform Act, states have the power to choose which courts may send
questions to their high courts. 203 For example, although the proposed language is
generous, some may choose to omit federal trial court questions and accept questions
only from the federal circuit courts and Supreme Court.204 Surprisingly, although the
Uniform Act contains optional provisions for certifications from tribal courts, only three
states have adopted those provisions: Arizona, Oklahoma, and Maryland.205 Many of the
other states, rich with robust tribal courts, are conspicuously absent, such as New
Mexico, Washington, the Dakotas, Michigan, New York, and so on. It is perhaps telling
that the largest states in the Union have chosen the most restrictive provisions of the
Uniform Act, including California, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and

Valencia-Weber, supra note 74, at 255-56; see also Florey, supra note 100, at 1690 (observing state
lack of understanding of the "cultural and procedural background" of issues in a case).
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See Fletcher,supra note 6.
See Long, supranote 185, at 125-26.
203. UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW [ACT] [RULE] § 8 (1967).
204. Chase, supra note 181, at n.5 (citing Richard Alan Chase, Note, New York's Certification Procedure:
Was it Worth the Wait? 63 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 539, 545 n.26).
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Texas. 2 06 A number of jurisdictions also have provisions for intra-jurisdictional
certification.207 For example, federal circuit courts of appeal have the ability "on paper"
to certify questions to the United States Supreme Court but have been reluctant to do so
because the Supreme Court has been so discouraging of the practice. 208
Despite initial concerns that the process would prove burdensome or even abusive,
at least one survey of the judiciary has determined that judges in both the federal and
state systems overwhelmingly feel that state judges are better equipped to interpret
complex and novel issues of state law than federal judges.209 Of the state and federal
judges surveyed, one hundred percent felt that federal judges were not more qualified
than state judges to determine state law.210 On the contrary - even among federal
judges, eighty five percent of district court judges and ninety percent of circuit court
judges felt that the state judges would be more qualified to answer such difficult
questions. 2 1
Given the aggressive stance that federal courts so often display in matters of
jurisdiction, one might presume that the results would be less favorable when it comes to
the better qualification of tribal judges to determine tribal law. However, at least in the
federal trial and circuit courts, judges faced with tribal court exhaustion issues (not
certification, which has not been presented to them as an issue), use language suggesting
a strong agreement that the tribal courts are much better qualified to address their own
legal issues.212 The language even goes so far as to show a strong reluctance to even
consider tribal legal questions, regardless of their simplicity or complexity, preferring to
rely upon the exhaustion doctrine to ensure that tribal courts create a record for review in
federal district court. 2 13
In the same study, a majority of judges (65%) felt certification was far more
economical for the parties and the court than the abstention process.214 When the judges
did express concern, it was not over the nature of the certification process itself, but over
the narrower question of whether courts should be permitted to certify questions that
only "may" be determinative, as opposed to questions that are already known to be
determinative in the underlying case.215 In addition to efficiency and accuracy, one of
the benefits of the certification is to promote federal courts' respect for state
sovereignty.216
Judge Bruce Selya of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has
roundly criticized certification and challenged most of its long-unquestioned
premises. 2 17 Calling certification out as a "sacred cow in our modern judicial barnyard,"
206.
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208.
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213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Cochran, supra note 191, at 167.
Id. at 171-72 (discussing the Ohio and federal schemes for internal certification).
Id. at 172.
Roebuck, supra note 179, at 306, 309-10.
Id. at 309-10.
Id. at 310.
Navajo Nation v. Intermountain Steel Bldgs., Inc., 42 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1228 (D. N.M. 1999)
Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Companies v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856 (1985).
Roebuck, supra note 179, at 308-09.
Id. at 310-11.
Chase, supra note 181, at 415-16.
See generally Hon. Bruce M. Selya, CertifiedMadness: Ask a Silly Question.. . , 29 SUFFOLK U. L.
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Judge Selya notes that certification has not fulfilled its promise of promoting cooperative
federalism among the courts. 2 18 He also characterizes it as a newcomer on the federal
judicial scene since it was first pressured upon the Fifth Circuit by the Supreme Court in
Clay v. Sun Insurance Qffice Ltd. 219

Among other criticisms, such as the fact that certified questions do not truly
present a full case or controversy, Judge Selya observed that the process itself is not
genuinely cooperative and does not truly protect state sovereignty over the determination
of state law. 22 0 First, while the vast majority of states have certification procedures in
place for federal courts, less than half have similar procedures for accepting questions
from courts in sister states.221 According to Judge Selya, this disparity shows that
certification results from the states' perception that federal courts pose a threat, and that
certification will somehow "keep the gorilla caged." 222 But "if the federal judiciary
really is regarded as an 800-pound gorilla, certification is exactly the wrong device for
keeping the beast at bay."223 States have no control over what questions are certified
their only control concerns which questions they refuse.224 Thus it is merely
"cooperation by way of the gorilla's benevolence." 22 5
Second, Judge Selya points out the obvious flaw that the process is not
reciprocal.226 If it were genuinely cooperative, states would also be able to certify
questions to the federal courts. 227 This argument lends credence to Professor Long's
critique that federal courts tend to view the certification process as a manner of engaging
the state judiciary as their inferiors to do their dirty work.228 Finally, Judge Selya and
Professor Long also agree that state courts are equally important players in the process of
enforcing federal law, and that the certification process suggests that neither court should
outright engage in developing the laws of the other. 229 Because federalism ensures that
neither can dictate the law of the other with finality, the risks are reduced to some loss of
consistency - something that is not promised to litigants in the Anglo-American
jurisprudential system in any event.230 Under this system then, certification destroys the
reciprocal parity that federal and state courts should enjoy in their ability to decide - or
at least predict - questions involving each other's law. 2 3 1
Professor Cochran's study of the Ohio certification experience partly bears out the

REV. 677 (1995).
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226. Id. at 684-85.
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228. Long, supra note 185, at 130-31.
229. Selya, supranote 217, at 687; see Long, supra note 185, at 153-54.
230. Selya, supranote 217, at 687, 690-91. Judge Selya points out that even if the federal court gets the state
law wrong, a litigant in state court might have exactly the same problem when the state's highest court
exercises its discretion to deny review. Id. at 690-91.
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critics' concerns that the need for certification is overstated and the risks to law
development are too great, at least in the state-federal context. 232 First, the fears of
inaccuracy and unreliability in federal court predictions of state law questions are small
in comparison to the other types of uncertainty inherent in American courts, which were
ably described above by Judge Selya.2 3 Professor Cochran agrees that the benefits of
federal judicial contributions to state law development far outweigh those risks. 234
Second, the notion that state court judges have a particular expertise in state law that
cannot be obtained by federal judges does not seem to have much support in reality,
especially considering the political reality that federal judges in a given jurisdiction tend
to be promoted from the ranks of state court judges and practitioners. 235
Finally, the third oft-touted benefit of certification is that it saves time and money
for litigants and courts. While this may be true in some instances, the Ohio example
shows that delays can still be significant, averaging about one year in that system, and
that courts and litigants often opt for other solutions, such as abstention-the very
process that certification was designed to ameliorate by providing a more efficient
alternative.236 Professor Cochran recognizes that the process still can play a valuable
role in the system, but it is one that should be played even less frequently and with better
quality control. 23 7
Cooperation Through Memoranda of Understanding
One of the most recent, powerful trends in relationships between tribes and other
domestic governments is the growing trend in tribal consultation requirements. In
November 2000, President Clinton issued an executive order mandating every federal
agency to consult with tribes on matters having "substantial direct effects" on one or
more tribes.238 In order to ameliorate some of the abuses of the past, the President
promulgated the policy to "establish regular and meaningful consultation and
collaboration with tribal officials in the development of Federal policies that have tribal
implications, to strengthen the United States government-to-government relationships
with Indian tribes, and to reduce the imposition of unfunded mandates upon Indian
tribes." 239
Even today, advocates for tribal interests consider the policy toothless because it
does not require the agencies to actually take tribal responses into consideration;240 the
agencies are only required to follow federal law and policy.241 Almost exactly nine years
232. See id. at 210, 215-16
233. Selya, supra note 217, at 690-9 1.
234. Cochran, supra note 191, at 210-13.
235. Id. at 213-16.
236. Id. at 216-17.
237. Id. at 220-21.
238. Exec. Order No. 13175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67249, 67249, 67250 (November 6, 2000).
239. Id. at 67249.
240. But see Gabriel S. Galanda, Galanda: The federal Indian consultation right: No paper tiger, INDIAN
COUNTRY
TODAY
MEDIA
NETWORK
(Dec.
6,
2010),
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/ictarchives/2010/12/06/galanda-the-federal-indian-consultationright-no-paper-tiger-81452 (observing that President Obama has taken steps to strengthen the enforcement of
the consultation requirement in all federal agencies).
241. Derek C. Haskew, Federal Consultation w1ith Indian Tribes: the Foundation of Enlightened Policy
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later, President Obama signaled a renewed intention to enforce the consultation
requirement when he issued a presidential memorandum requiring the head of every
federal agency to develop a formal plan for consultation within ninety days, to be
followed by annual reports in perpetuity.242 In the federal regulatory arena, tribal-federal
consultation may only consist of a short meeting in which the tribal council is simply
notified of the federal government's intended action and given an opportunity to
respond.243 They confer no real rights other than, at times, an expectation of the
consultation itself.244 As such, the process has been fraught with disappointments and
other not-so-subtle effects of drastically disproportionate situated power, including antiIndianism.245
The notion of a required tribal consultation is much older than the policies of the
Clinton and Obama administrations. It has its roots in the treaty-making era, when the
United States and the many Indigenous nations formed agreements on what was at least
purported to be an arm's length basis. 246 It has further roots in the centuries-old federal
trust responsibility owed by the United States to the tribal nations. 247
Despite its fame for setting a positive example to jurisdictions around the globe,
the historic New York-New South Wales agreement had a very pragmatic genesis. New
York is a center of world trade, and many international business contracts include a
choice of law clause selecting New York.248 Those contracts are often litigated in
foreign courts, which must interpret and apply New York law as foreign law. 249 In
Australia, a question of foreign law is "'a question of fact of a peculiar kind."' 2 50 While
foreign law determinations are unquestionably "legal" in nature and determined by the
court rather than the jury, Australian advocates prove foreign law through a battle of
expert witnesses.251 As a result, proving foreign law tends to become rather expensive
and time-consuming.252 Moreover, some litigants had to resort to using Australian
lawyers as witnesses, which led to concerns for accuracy.253 After New South Wales
formed a similar consultation agreement with Singapore's courts, New York and New
South Wales reached their accord. 254
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WE HAVE EVERYTHING BEFORE US: CONCLUSIONS

Tribal courts can promote and protect sovereignty by engaging states on a
government-to-government basis to determine the best ways to acknowledge and apply
each other's law. No one approach is necessarily the best for a single tribe or even a
single situation, and all are subject to abuses, particularly where maligned and threatened
tribal courts are concerned. The best foundation for a successful collaboration, while
lowering the risks to tribal sovereignty, is to form lasting relationships of trust between
courts and especially among individual judges and staff. Even when a solution is
reached that "looks good on paper" and seems truly to promote comity and esteem for
tribal institutions, to what effect those solutions are used will depend on sentiments of
trust and respect developed between people.
One of the best vehicles for developing such relationships in a professional context
is the state judicial conference, where state, tribal, and federal judges can meet,
communicate about shared issues, and educate one another about underlying values,
policies, and administrative matters. It is particularly important for the tribal judiciary to
meet and be heard in this face-to-face type of contact, as the myths, fears, ignorance, and
even disregard of tribal courts run rampant among those who lack information or who
believe stereotypes and biased images such as the "rich Indian" stereotype resulting from
the gaming explosion.255 Once those relationships are established, or at least underway,
helpful vehicles for judicial cooperation and communication include abstention,
certification, and consultation.
As for discrete examples of cooperative arrangements for ascertaining and
applying tribal law in the state context, the option that appears to offer the best protection
to tribal sovereignty is the development of a tribal court abstention doctrine like the one
used at the federal level. An abstention doctrine encourages the proliferation of tribal
courts and a rich tribal docket by allowing tribal courts to develop records and to declare
their own laws to the states in the process. Where the model should diverge from the
federal; however, is in the treatment of abstention as a quasi-appellate process. The
federal courts should not be viewed by federal judges or others as part of the path of
appeal from a tribal court decision on a tribal law issue, and nor should the state courts.
In the Anglo-American aspects of the United States multi-sovereign court system, appeal
can be had from a state's high court to the United States Supreme Court on a federal
issue, but not a state issue.
Despite the lack of parity between state and federal courts, the same is not true for
the review of state law decisions from the United States Supreme Court to a state's
highest court. Tribal law decisions should appear under evaluation in state court only as
a matter of enforcement under the principles of full faith and credit or comity, or as a
matter of collateral attack based on proper jurisdiction. In the latter event, simultaneous
actions in state and tribal court should be deferred to the tribal court where tribal legal
issues arguably exist, and once the matter resumes in state court, the tribal court's
determination of jurisdiction under its own laws should be given the highest deference.
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For those situations where abstention may prove too costly or dilatory, or where no
tribal forum is available, the choice between a codified certification procedure or a
memorandum of understanding to consult will depend upon how much power each court
wishes to obtain, whether the sister court will grant great or total deference to the
answering court's statement of its own law, and whether the history of cooperation and
trust between sister courts can support a respectful use of those instruments.
Certification may offer skeptical state judges an incentive to step into the uneasy new
role of selecting and applying tribal law in appropriate cases when it might otherwise be
overlooked, out of fear or ignorance, in favor of state law.
On the other hand, the federal lesson shows that unless the certification procedure
institutionalizes true reciprocity, both in word and in practice so that tribes may also
certify questions to state high courts and have them answered in appropriate cases, tribal
courts run the risk that they will be treated as inferior courts. Unilateral certification rules
send the message to institutions and to individual judges on both sides of the equation
that the certifying court has more prestige and value. In some situations, they also send
the message that the answering jurisdiction's very law is not worthy of consideration by
the more prestigious court. Of course, the opposite can also be true in the sense that the
certifying court sees the value of applying tribal law and in "getting it right." 2 56
In situations where a reluctant tribal council, state legislature, or high court does
not wish to codify a certification procedure - or to make it reciprocal - or where other
constitutional impediments prohibit such an enactment, less formal understandings
between courts or even individual judges may help to further the esteem of tribal law and
courts over time, and may even lead to more formal arrangements as trust,
understanding, and respect grow stronger. As in the New York and New South Wales
example, courts may cooperate for the determination of each other's law as foreign law
in a relatively advisory process.257 Of course, the informal, non-binding, advisory nature
of this process raises a host of concerns about quality control and public expectations in
the validity of those decisions beyond the private litigants. On a purely legal level, tribal
and state courts are not always subject to the same types of Article III mandates that
prevent the promulgation of advisory opinions by federal courts. But, on a practical
level, the concerns behind the Article III prohibition may ring just as true. In some
cases, it may be that the best use of consultation agreements is for general education
about sources of applicable law and the sharing of primary tribal law materials that might
not otherwise be publicly available, rather than the practice of issuing advisory-type
opinions.
Where interactions have been particularly hostile in recent past, the consultation
agreement may be the much safer option for many tribes for the near future, until
understanding and respect have a chance to grow. Because the parties to a memorandum
of understanding come to the table without the calcified expectations of a certification
model, which is already used extensively around the country and has a preferred
structure in the form of the Uniform Act, they arrive at that table with more equal
bargaining power. The exchange can be as great or as limited as the parties desire,
256. Pearson, supra note 119, at 744.
257. Lee, supranote 248.
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subject only to the governing law and political pressures in their respective sovereignties.
Ultimately, this may be the much safer, "toe in the water" approach for tribes who may
logically fear they have more tangibly to lose in engaging the state than they have to
gain. If minimal agreements to educate one another, to meet, and to discuss recurring
foreign law issues arriving before their courts are successful, more formal arrangements
may later become more attractive - or perhaps even entirely unnecessary except where
a binding effect is needed, such as in the recognition of each other's judgments.
Whatever options are chosen, the stakes for tribal sovereignty and the health of the
tribal institutions that express, expand, and strengthen that sovereignty are much higher
for tribal nations than for the states. For this practical reason, and despite the unfairness
and irony of the situation, it may be more incumbent upon tribal leaders and judges to
make the first steps in reaching out to build trust with their state counterparts. As in the
example of Judges Raasch and Brunner in Wisconsin, it can start with just two people
who are able to connect, form a friendly professional bond, and to exhibit that mutual
respect to their peers in the hope of starting a gradual contagion. And regardless of
methods chosen, those relationships will ultimately determine (at least initially) the
success of the program and whether it will be abused by the state, which undeniably
comes to the table with much greater political power.
The perplexing relationships between states, Tribes, and the national government
result from the shifting sands of Anglo-American policy toward Native nations. The
pendular swings in federal Indian policy have resulted in the paradoxical status of Native
nations in the federal system today, alluding to the paradoxes Dickens identified in the
French Revolution, another instance of crisis and opportunity in a different time and a
different land. 258 The Tribal nations are neither constitutional governments nor
completely extra-constitutional. They are neither states nor foreign governments. Their
sovereignty is declared by outsiders to be either totally inherent or a purely
Congressional invention. Tribes are mostly prohibited by federal law from negotiating
with the states, yet must often do so in order to survive. They are simultaneously
encouraged by federal policy to determine their own destinies, while finding their
sovereignty eroded by the same paternal, and often hostile federal system. The Tribes'
sovereign court systems are at once celebrated as indispensable players in the national
judicial system, while their civil and criminal jurisdiction is continually eroded through
successive federal decisions.
These paradoxes exist today because while federal policy can be described as
taking a more enlightened turn beginning in the 1970s, the reality is that much of the
distrust and animosity from earlier eras continues, even in this time of selfdetermination. Until that distrust and animosity is identified as a defacto source of law,
it will remain a barrier to effective co-existence. Fortunately, there is great potential for
increased understanding and mutual support between state and Tribal governments,
encouraging a time of mindful pluralism and the politics of abundance - an "era of
enlightenment."
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